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Abstract
What if gravity satisfied the Klein-Gordon equation? Both particle physics from
the 1920s-30s and the 1890s Neumann-Seeliger modification of Newtonian gravity with
exponential decay suggest considering a “graviton mass term” for gravity, which is
algebraic in the potential. Unlike Nordstro¨m’s “massless” theory, massive scalar grav-
ity is strictly special relativistic in the sense of being invariant under the Poincare´
group but not the 15-parameter Bateman-Cunningham conformal group. It therefore
exhibits the whole of Minkowski space-time structure, albeit only indirectly concerning
volumes. Massive scalar gravity is plausible in terms of relativistic field theory, while
violating most interesting versions of Einstein’s principles of general covariance, general
relativity, equivalence, and Mach. Geometry is a poor guide to understanding massive
scalar gravity(s): matter sees a conformally flat metric due to universal coupling, but
gravity also sees the rest of the flat metric (barely or on long distances) in the mass
term. What is the ‘true’ geometry, one might wonder, in line with Poincare´’s modal
conventionality argument? Infinitely many theories exhibit this bimetric ‘geometry,’
all with the total stress-energy’s trace as source; thus geometry does not explain the
field equations. The irrelevance of the Ehlers-Pirani-Schild construction to a critique
of conventionalism becomes evident when multi-geometry theories are contemplated.
Much as Seeliger envisaged, the smooth massless limit indicates underdetermination of
theories by data between massless and massive scalar gravities—indeed an unconceived
alternative. At least one version easily could have been developed before General Rel-
ativity; it then would have motivated thinking of Einstein’s equations along the lines
of Einstein’s newly re-appreciated “physical strategy” and particle physics and would
have suggested a rivalry from massive spin 2 variants of General Relativity (massless
spin 2, Pauli and Fierz found in 1939). The Putnam-Gru¨nbaum debate on convention-
ality is revisited with an emphasis on the broad modal scope of conventionalist views.
Massive scalar gravity thus contributes to a historically plausible rational reconstruc-
tion of much of 20th-21st century space-time philosophy in the light of particle physics.
An appendix reconsiders the Malament-Weatherall-Manchak conformal restriction of
conventionality and constructs the ‘universal force’ influencing the causal structure.
Subsequent works will discuss how massive gravity could have provided a template
for a more Kant-friendly space-time theory that would have blocked Moritz Schlick’s
supposed refutation of synthetic a priori knowledge, and how Einstein’s false analogy
between the Neumann-Seeliger-Einstein modification of Newtonian gravity and the
cosmological constant Λ generated lasting confusion that obscured massive gravity as
a conceptual possibility.
keywords: Klein-Gordon equation; Hugo von Seeliger; Carl Neumann; Bateman-
Cunningham conformal group; Nordstrom scalar gravity; cosmological constant; convention-
alism; underdetermination; explanation and geometry; massive gravitons; neo-Kantianism
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1 Introduction
Plausibly, when one comes to recognize the historical contingency of hitherto apparently
unavoidable ideas about the world, one can take a more critical attitude and rework one’s
beliefs to fit evidence and argument more fully. Mach’s historical-critical investigations in
physics exemplified that idea. More formally, it is plausible that the order in which one
receives pieces of evidence ought not to affect one’s final degrees of belief (Wagner, 2002),
a criterion for avoiding one sort of historical accident. Failure of imagination can lead to
our not entertaining theories that are comparably good to the ones that we did entertain;
such unconceived alternatives undermine scientific realism (Stanford, 2006). In the inter-
est of freeing ourselves from historical accidents regarding space-time theory, it is prudent,
therefore, to employ whatever systematic means exist for generating plausible alternative
theories.
Fortunately, there is a largely untapped source here, namely, the literature that studies
all possible classical (i.e. not quantum) relativistic wave equations. That literature has
gone untapped for a number of reasons, including a superficially quantum vocabulary. That
literature is particle physics, of which Wigner’s taxonomy of relativistic wave equations in
terms of mass and spin (Wigner, 1939) is a prominent example. The terms “mass” and
“spin,” which misleadingly suggest concepts appropriate to quantum particles rather than
relativistic waves, exemplify the vocabulary issue, on which more below. While space-time
physics ought to be quantization-ready in the sense of recognizing that electrons and other
fermions exist (though not much like light and gravity, the usual stars of space-time phi-
losophy (Pitts, 2012)) and that classical theories are not the last word, this paper’s use of
particle physics literature will be entirely as a resource for classical relativistic fields and the
space-time philosophy thereof.
In the 1910s Gunnar Nordstro¨m proposed a theory of gravity that met the strictures of Spe-
cial Relativity (Norton, 1992; Renn and Schemmel, 2007; von Laue, 1917; Bergmann, 1956)
in the sense of having, at least, Lorentz transformations as well as space- and time-
translations as symmetries, and displaying retarded action through a field medium, as
opposed to Newtonian instantaneous action at a distance. This use of the 10-parameter
Poincare´ symmetry group reflects a Kleinian subtractive strategy of gradually depriving co-
ordinates of physical meaning via symmetries, as opposed to a Riemannian additive strategy
(Norton, 1999b). There is a larger group of potential symmetries that one might contem-
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plate, namely, the Bateman-Cunningham 15-parameter conformal group (Bateman, 1909;
Bateman, 1910; Cunningham, 1910); Nordstro¨m’s theory, which is massless spin 0 in terms of
particle physics, is invariant under that group, whereas massive theories are strictly Poincare´-
invariant. Nordstro¨m’s scalar gravity was a serious competitor to Einstein’s program for some
years during the middle 1910s. Neglecting time dependence and nonlinearity, it gives Pois-
son’s equation just as Newton’s theory does. Nordstro¨m’s theory was eclipsed first by the
theoretical brilliance of Einstein’s much more daring project and the latter’s better treat-
ment of Mercury in 1915 (though a “dark matter” patch might have been possible), and
then by the empirical success of Einstein’s theory in the bending of light in 1919, a result
manifestly inconsistent with Nordstro¨m’s theory.
It is well known that Nordstro¨m’s theory does not bend light (Kraichnan, 1955). That
is an immediate consequence of the conformal flatness of the metric in Nordstro¨m’s theory
in geometrical form (Einstein and Fokker, 1914). and the conformal invariance of Maxwell’s
electromagnetism (Wald, 1984): space-time is flat in Nordstro¨m’s theory except for the vol-
ume element, but light doesn’t see the volume element in Maxwell’s theory in 4 space-time
dimensions.
While representing gravity primarily by a scalar field is no longer a viable physical proposal,
there is a great deal that can be learned, surprisingly, by filling in a hole left by the prema-
ture abandonment of Nordstro¨m’s scalar gravity theory due to Einstein’s inventing General
Relativity (GR) ‘too soon.’ While it is evident to particle physicists that Einstein’s the-
ory would have arisen eventually without Einstein (see, e.g, (Feynman et al., 1995)), Hans
Ohanian, author of a General Relativity textbook (Ohanian and Ruffini, 1994) and not a
particle physicist, has been prepared to offer, along with some vigorous opinions, even a
fairly specific date:
. . . [I]f Einstein had not introduced the mistaken Principle of Equivalence and
approached the theory of general relativity via this twisted path, other physicists
would have discovered the theory of general relativity some twenty years later, via
a path originating in relativistic quantum mechanics. (Ohanian, 2008, p. 334).
Personally I can imagine it perhaps taking as long as 30 years, but one mustn’t be too
particular about dates in counterfactual history. In any case the task at hand is to
learn what could have been learned in the intervening 20-30 years of that counterfactual
history before Einstein’s equations were found. Scalar gravity has the disadvantage of
having been empirically falsified in 1919, but that isn’t as bad as it sounds—witness
the ongoing reflections on scalar gravity by physicists, often with no particular philo-
sophical or historical interests (Gu¨rsey, 1953; Littlewood, 1953; Wellner and Sandri, 1964;
Dowker, 1965; Harvey, 1965; Pietenpol and Speiser, 1972; Shapiro and Teukolsy, 1993;
Watt and Misner, 1999; Yo et al., 2001; Calogero, 2003; Calogero and Rein, 2004;
Sundrum, 2004; Girelli et al., 2009; Manrique and Reuter, 2010; Deruelle, 2011;
Garrett, 2011; Deruelle and Sasaki, 2011; Romero et al., 2012; Alca´ntara Fe´lix et al., 2014).
Thinking seriously about scalar gravity helps one to separate the wheat from the chaff in
Einstein’s arguments. For example, as early as 1907 Einstein concluded that a relativistic
field theory of gravity could not describe gravity with a scalar potential. In the common
sympathetic Einstein historiography, this conclusion is often presented as a result, or at least
isn’t challenged. As it happens, Einstein’s argument was wrong (Giulini, 2008):
On his way to General Relativity, Einstein gave several arguments as to why
a special-relativistic theory of gravity based on a massless scalar field could be
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ruled out merely on grounds of theoretical considerations. We re-investigate his
two main arguments, which relate to energy conservation and some form of the
principle of the universality of free fall. We find such a theory-based a priori
abandonment not to be justified. Rather, the theory seems formally perfectly
viable, though in clear contradiction with (later) experiments. (Giulini, 2008)
Einstein here seems to have made a lucky mistake, a habit to which Ohanian calls attention.
HOW MUCH OF AN ADVANTAGE did Einstein gain over his colleagues by his
mistakes? Typically, about ten or twenty years. (Ohanian, 2008, p. 334, sic)
There would have been much less reason to consider a tensor theory of gravity so early
without erroneous arguments against scalar gravity.
Giulini illustrates two important themes: both the a priori plausibility of a graviton mass
(to borrow quantum terms for a classical context) and the haste in which the idea is typically
eliminated on narrowly empirical grounds, as though nothing conceptually interesting lay in
the possibility of a small but nonzero graviton mass.
In modern terminology, a natural way to proceed would be to consider fields ac-
cording to mass and spin, [footnote suppressed] discuss their possible equations,
the inner consistency of the mathematical schemes so obtained, and finally their
experimental consequences. Since gravity is a classical, macroscopically observ-
able, and long-ranged field, one usually assumes right at the beginning the spin
to be integral and the mass parameter to be zero. The first thing to consider
would therefore be a massless scalar field. What goes wrong with such a theory?
(Giulini, 2008)
That route leads first to Nordstro¨m’s theory (massive spin-0), but there is no compelling
reason to think that the mass is 0 rather than just small. In entertaining scientific theories,
one might wish to consider not only trying to get to the truth (in terms of prior probability
and evidence), but also utilities (Maher, 2008). While there are other kinds of utilities, the
utility of being philosophically interesting is especially relevant in this context. Grinding out
one more decimal place might or might not be very important, depending on the details.
Keeping a precise count of the number of pigeons in Chicago, though it would yield ecological
facts, seems not worth the effort. But adding a mass term in gravity has a high philosophical
utility in that one can thereby make a large conceptual-metaphysical difference with an
arbitrarily small empirical difference (Pitts, 2011b). Such theories can show us that what
seemed to be inevitable philosophical lessons given current scientific knowledge, might in fact
be optional. If today’s lessons are not optional because other paths would have converged
on them, the lessons might still be justified by reasons other than those usually given.
This introductory section will close with an outline of what is to come. One section gives
further background on relativistic wave equations and particle physics, including potentially
confusing but standard and nearly unavoidable quantum terminology for theories that might
be classical. If (following Pascual Jordan) one expects to take a classical field theory and
quantize it, it doesn’t seem important to avoid quantum words that apply literally to the
expected finished product and that have clear classical analogs. Subsequent sections consider
various major issues in space-time philosophy and show how massive scalar gravity, either
in itself or in the strong hints that it gives for massive spin-2 gravity (which relates to
General Relativity as massive scalar gravity relates to Nordstro¨m’s theory) or both, gives a
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very different perspective. Gravity could have fit within Minkowski space-time (with only
the Poincare´ symmetry group) if gravity had been a massive scalar field. The apparent
explanatory utility of geometrical descriptions of gravity depends mostly upon considering
only a narrow collection of theories with the special property of having only one of each
type of geometric object plausibly related to geometry (metric, volume element, connection,
projective connection, etc.); in general it is much more helpful to consider the laws or (more
or less the same thing assuming that a variational principle exists) the Lagrangian density.
The mass term is a tool for violating pretty much all of Einstein’s famous Principles, at least
in the strong senses that imply interesting conclusions. Mass terms being plausible, Einstein’s
Principles are correspondingly less plausible than one might have thought (even given their
supposed empirical success). Debates on conventionalism (including critiques of Poincare´ by
Eddington and of Gru¨nbaum by Putnam et al.) are seen to depend crucially on what one
takes the relevant modal scope of the discussion to be. Conventionalism at its best considers
a broad modal scope including multi-geometry theories, and invokes universal forces only in
the less friendly special case of single-geometry theories, whereas the opposing views appear
simply to ignore the possibility of multi-geometry theories. An appendix reconsiders the
Malament-Weatherall-Manchak view that conventionality of the space-time metric must be
restricted to conformally related metrics, leaving only the volume element as conventional.
Taking Thomas’s conformal-volume decomposition of a metric into its irreducible parts and
applying it to both metrics in Reichenbach’s conventionality formula g′µν+Fµν = gµν , one can
construct the ‘universal force’ that relates the two conformal structures, evading the claimed
conformal restriction.
2 Wigner’s Mass-Spin Taxonomy of Relativistic Wave
Equations
The range of options in relativistic classical field theory can be found in work from the
1920s-30s in the guise of relativistic quantum wave equations: one merely needs to interpret
the “wave function” as a classical field. Indeed an older physics idiom used the term “second
quantization” to reflect the fact than a wave equation that one perhaps initially met as a
quantum particle’s wave equation (the Klein-Gordon equation, Dirac equation, or the like),
was mathematically just a classical field. Thus “second-quantizing” such a relativistic wave
equation would give a quantum field theory, while leaving it alone would give a classical
field theory. Nowadays, with the triumph of Jordan’s subsumption of all matter into fields,
one rarely hears of anything being “second-quantized.” But works on quantum field theory
still contain large warmup exercises in classical field theory—often the first few chapters of a
book, with many other relevant bits scattered throughout. Likewise, one can learn important
things about relativistic classical field theory by reading articles nominally about quantum
field theory in such paradigmatically particle physics-oriented venues as Nuclear Physics
B. Indeed much of what one learns about “Special Relativity” from particle physics litera-
ture, though perfectly classical in nature, is harder to learn elsewhere, especially in newer
literature. Some examples might be the parity-flipping off-brand tensors (pseudo-scalars,
axial vectors, etc.), the 15-parameter conformal group and its association with massless-
ness, massive wave equations, spinors, irreducibility of representations, Belinfante-Rosenfeld
equivalence of canonical and metric stress-energy tensors, and two newer examples, the
“improved” energy-momentum tensor (Callan et al., 1970) and nonlinear group realizations
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(Ogievetski˘i and Polubarinov, 1965; Coleman et al., 1969; Isham et al., 1971). One finds
the divide overcome primarily in work on supergravity (including strings!) and on gauge
theories of gravity. Thus neither special nor general relativistic physics is easily fully and
accurately comprehensible without attention to particle physics, notwithstanding various
traditional-institutional arrangements in physics, philosophy and technical history of sci-
ence, especially literature consumption habits.
Indeed one thing that one learns from particle physics literature is that while a theory
might be known to be invariant under the 10-parameter Poincare´ symmetry group (3 boosts,
3 rotations, and 4 translations for the part connected to the identity), additional symme-
tries sometimes arise indirectly (Feynman et al., 1995; Deser, 1970; Ogievetsky, 1973). Such
additional symmetries might be as mild as the 15-parameter Bateman-Cunningham con-
formal group, or as wild as the gauge symmetry of Einstein’s General Relativity. There
is a respectable usage according to which theories invariant under the 15-parameter con-
formal group do not fit within Special Relativity (Misner et al., 1973, p. 179, 187-189)
(Norton, 1992, p. 19), because they do not exhibit the full Minkowski space-time structure.
Hence one might initially think that one has a special relativistic theory, and then discover
that one doesn’t after all. Such a shift might feel unsettling, or seem impossible, if one is
wedded to a Riemannian “additive” strategy (Norton, 1999b) of starting with a manifold
and adding structures (straight paths, parallel transport, length, etc.) bit-by-bit, because
adding structures and pronouncing them “real” sounds so permanent. Such a shift is, how-
ever, quite natural in terms of a Kleinian “subtractive” strategy in which progressively larger
symmetry groups strip away reality from structures antecedently considered meaningful. On
the other hand, Kleinian subtractions can feel permanent as well, as in the elimination of
Lorentz’s aether on the way to Einstein’s version of Special Relativity and the elimination
of preferred coordinate systems on the way to General Relativity.1
One lesson here is that it isn’t the case that the Kleinian picture is obsolete; but neither
should one embrace Klein and reject Riemann. Rather than thinking of either Riemannian
addition or Kleinian elimination as a strategy for making irreversible progress, it is helpful
to think in both directions without prejudice, as moves that can be made depending on
the circumstances. One should be prepared to run the Riemannian additive strategy in
reverse if the need arises, if a formerly “real” structure proves superfluous due to a new
Kleinian argument. To that end, it can be helpful to avoid such reifying terms as “Spe-
cial Relativity” and “Minkowski space-time,” which, not coincidentally, are nouns,2 in favor
of adjectives such as “Poincare´-invariant” or perhaps “special relativistic.” A useful cor-
rective is thus found in such a title as “Minkowski Space-time: A Glorious Non-entity”
(Brown and Pooley, 2006). But evidence could come to support a new Riemannian addi-
tion undoing a Kleinian subtraction. Such would occur if a satisfactory massive graviton
theory were devised and then empirically confirmed (or it could occur in some other way).
Scalar gravity being obsolete, that could only happen for massive spin-2 gravity, which has
seen renewed attention in the last 15 years (after a dearth from 1972) and an explosion of
work since 2010 (Hinterbichler, 2012; de Rham, 2014), but it brings up many subtleties as
well. Indeed physicists have recently contemplated theories in which not only do two metrics
1Whether preferred coordinate systems were fully eliminated is not entirely obvious in the wake of the
failure of the Anderson-Friedman absolute objects program to yield the expected conclusion that General
Relativity is substantively generally covariant (Pitts, 2006; Giulini, 2007), the culprit being
√−g.
2Worries about reification, misplaced concreteness, hypostatization, and the like are not new, but they
find a nice example in space-time philosophy.
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exist, but both couple to matter (Akrami et al., 2015); in general there exists no effective
pseudo-Riemannian metric describing what exists, but one can define an effective Finslerian
metric, for which the infinitesimal Pythagorean theorem involves a quartic form and hence a
symmetric rank-4 metric tensor. My task at hand is much simpler because of the assumption
that matter sees only one metric (as usual in massive spin-2 gravity), and for spin-0 gravity
the two metrics are conformally related.
Additional insight from the particle physics side of classical relativistic field theory pertains
to two modifications that one might envisage making to the wave equation
∂µ∂
µφ = (−∂2/∂t2 +∇2)φ = 0
for a source-free wave equation satisfied by nearly any physical potential φ (which might be
a scalar, a vector, a spinor, etc.).3 In the static, spherically symmetric case in spherical polar
coordinates, one has
1
r2
∂
∂r
(
r2
∂φ
∂r
)
= 0
outside sources, giving (with reasonable boundary conditions) a 1
r
potential and, after tak-
ing the derivative, a 1
r2
force. This is familiar, but worth saying for comparison to two
alternatives, especially because the potentials are more tractable than the forces.
A modification that tends to go unconceived in the context of General Relativity, but is
routine in particle physics, involves adding an algebraic term in φ in the field equations. The
coefficient of such an algebraic term, if the sign is suitable, is called the “mass” (squared) of
the particle/field φ. Such terminology makes inessential use of Planck’s constant to achieve
proper units; instead one could simply regard the quantity as a new inverse length scale,
something that many particles/fields demonstrably have (weak bosons, electrons, nowadays
at least some neutrinos, etc., less fundamental entities such as protons and neutrons, and
various less famous particles, whether fundamental or composite), and by analogy, presum-
ably might be had by any particle/field. The resulting wave equation, which was invented
multiple times around 1926 (Kragh, 1984), is known as the Klein-Gordon equation
(−∂2/∂t2 +∇2 −m2)φ = 0.
“Particle mass” is just a property of a classical field, expressed in entrenched quantum
terminology, for which there is no brief alternative. In the static, spherically symmetric case,
this equation becomes
(∇2 −m2)φ = 1
r2
∂
∂r
(
r2
∂φ
∂r
)
−m2φ = 0.
For a massive theory, one gets a faster exponential fall-off as 1
r
e−mr. More specifically,
a graviton mass m gives the potential −GM
r
e−mr, which gives a attractive force that is
3One can of course also add sources—charge density, energy-momentum density, or the like—to the right
side of the equation. It might turn out that (as in Brans-Dicke gravity, e.g.) it isn’t terribly clear whether
some terms belong on the right side as sources, or on the left side akin to ∂µ∂
µφ. The choice might be
merely conventional, especially classically (Faraoni and Nadeau, 2007). Arguably (though less convincingly),
there is no fact of the matter in General Relativity either, which absence can be useful (Kraichnan, 1955;
Deser, 1970; Pitts and Schieve, 2001; Deser, 2010). More generally, one can include interactions and even
self-interactions, making the equation nonlinear.
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qualitatively similar to the more common m = 0 case, proportional to the heavy body’s
mass M and merely weakening faster with distance thanks to the graviton mass m. If one
pays attention to units—a good habit enforced upon beginning students and later lost by
theorists—one notices that m functions as an inverse length. If one takes m to be really a
mass, then mc
~
is an inverse length; setting c = 1 and ~ = 1 as usual makes mass and inverse
length the same; the length is the reduced Compton wavelength. A classical theory should
know nothing of ~, however, so one can take mc
~
as primitive, a new inverse length in the
wave equation. Using units such that c = 1 and ~ = 1 will remove the need to make such
distinctions. A 1
r
e−mr potential appeared in or before the 1890s in astronomy and physics
in the works of Seeliger and Neumann4 (Neumann, 1886; Pockels, 1891; Neumann, 1896;
von Seeliger, 1896; Norton, 1999a) and again due to Yukawa in particle physics in the 1930s
(Yukawa, 1935). The inverse of m is known as the range of the field, so nonzero m gives
a field a finite-range, while m = 0 gives a “long” or “infinite” range. For the electro-weak
theory, for example, the weak nuclear force is not noticeable in daily life as electromagnetism
is because the weak force is massive and hence short-ranged, though its mass arises in a more
subtle way attributed to the Higgs particle/field. While simply adding a mass term works
fine for electromagnetism even under quantization, and works classically for Yang-Mills,
there are distinctively quantum field theoretic reasons (trouble at 1-loop (Slavnov, 1972;
Boulware and Deser, 1972; Hurth, 1997)) for introducing the Higgs particle in Yang-Mills.
Even so, the Higgs particle gives rise, after a field redefinition suited to the true minimum
energy, to an effective mass term for the vector bosons. Now that the Higgs is empirically
confirmed, it is still worthwhile to recall why it ‘had to be there’ before it was seen.
A graviton mass term violates the supposedly fairly generic template
OP (POT ) = SOURCE
(Renn, 2005; Renn and Sauer, 2007) (SOURCE being some kind of source term involving
mass-energy, POT being the gravitational potential, and OP being a purely second-order
differential operator) that Einstein employed in searching for his field equations. If one comes
to believe that matter is relativistic fields, one will want a mass term (inverse length scale)
in the wave equation in order to have matter that can sit still, like a tree, rather than travel
at the speed of light. (We don’t, of course, presently observe light or gravity sitting still
in that sense; perhaps they can’t, but that isn’t yet clear.) While the concept of adding
a ‘particle mass’ term in the modern sense was not fully available in the 1910s, the anal-
ogous concept was entertained for relativistic photons (which lacked the Seeliger-Neumann
precedent) already in the early 1920s by de Broglie (de Broglie, 1922; de Broglie, 1923;
de Broglie, 1924). During the 1920s-30s progress in relativistic quantum theory, the con-
cept of adding a mass term to the wave equation would become routine. Massive photons
were explored initially Proca in terms of fields in 1930s, and later Schro¨dinger and others
(Proca, 1936; de Broglie, 1940; de Broglie, 1942; Schro¨dinger, 1943b; Schro¨dinger, 1943a;
Belinfante, 1949; Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955; Poenaru and Calboreanu, 2006).
In massive electromagnetism, the kinetic term −1
4
FµνF
µν in the Lagrangian density has
a gauge symmetry, but the mass term −1
2
m2AµAµ breaks the gauge symmetry. Massive
4Norton has insightfully discussed the problem of Neumann’s 1890s priority claim with a brief reference
to Neumann’s 1870s work (Norton, 1999a), the problem being that no such Neumann work seems to exist.
In particular ((Neumann, 1874)) does not seem to be the right paper. I note that Neumann’s 1886 paper in
a sister journal (Neumann, 1886) at least is relevant and appeared some years before the mid-1890s, though
it isn’t from quite the right journal, the right decade, or the right pages.
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theories also have the advantage of being local in terms of the true degrees of freedom,
unlike gauge theories (Sundermeyer, 1982), perhaps giving the best of both worlds to
some degree. In terms of quantization, broken gauge theories are somewhat special in
relation to naturalness, inheriting some of the benefits of the symmetry that they almost
have (’t Hooft, 1980; Dine, 2015). Strikingly, ’t Hooft exempted gravity from naturalness
because the cosmological constant was already known to violate it. On the other hand,
a small spin-2 graviton mass should be compatible with naturalness because the massless
theory (General Relativity) is more symmetric than the massive theory(s). While typical
scalar field theories do not become more symmetric with 0 mass, massive Nordstro¨m scalar
gravities do become more symmetric, shifting from the Poincare´ group to the 15-parameter
conformal group. ’t Hooft notes that for scalar theories “[c]onformal symmetry is violated at
the quantum level.” However, he argues that one have a self-interacting massive φ4 theory
that is natural as long as the self-interaction is small (because in a free theory particles
are conserved) or the mass and self-interaction are both small. What seems to be excluded
is for the mass to be small but the self-interaction large. Fortunately the self-interaction
terms for universally coupled massive scalar gravities are of the form m2
√
G
j−2
φj (j ≥ 3)
(Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Pitts, 2011a), implying that the self-interaction is also
small if the graviton mass is small. The massless limit of massive electromagnetism (some-
times called a neutral vector meson if the electromagnetic interpretation is not emphasized)
is smooth not only in classical field theory (Jackson, 1975), but also in quantum field the-
ory (Belinfante, 1949; Glauber, 1953; Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955; Stueckelberg, 1957;
Boulware and Gilbert, 1962; Boulware, 1970; Goldhaber and Nieto, 1971;
Slavnov and Faddeev, 1971; Boulware and Deser, 1972; Goldhaber and Nieto, 2010;
Shizuya, 1975; Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004; Slavnov, 1972), yielding an interesting case of
the underdetermination of theories by data with a non-standard logical form (Pitts, 2011b).
Inspired by de Broglie and Pauli-Fierz, Marie-Antoinette Tonnelat and Ge´rard Petiau
explored massive gravitons in the 1940s (Tonnelat, 1941a; Tonnelat, 1941b; Tonnelat, 1941c;
Tonnelat, 1941d; Tonnelat, 1941e; Petiau, 1941c; Petiau, 1941b; Petiau, 1941a;
Tonnelat, 1942a; Tonnelat, 1942b; de Broglie, 1943; Tonnelat, 1943; Petiau, 1943a;
Petiau, 1943b; Petiau, 1943c; Tonnelat, 1944a; Tonnelat, 1944b; Tonnelat, 1944c;
Petiau, 1944a; Petiau, 1944b; Petiau, 1945; Petiau, 1946a; Petiau, 1946b; de Broglie, 1954).
The gravitational case is in fact earlier, due to Neumann, Seeliger and Einstein. Massive
theories are plausible in terms of relativistic field theory. As Freund, Maheshwari and
Schonberg put it,
In the Newtonian limit, equation (1) is now replaced by the Neumann-Yukawa
equation,
(∆−m2)V = κρ (3),
which leads to the quantum-mechanically reasonable Yukawa potential
V (r) = −κMe
−mr
r
, (4)
rather than the peculiar oscillator [due to the cosmological constant Λ] of equation
(2). (Freund et al., 1969).
This potential was sufficiently plausible as to be independently invented 3 times (Seeliger
among many other potentials, Neumann, and Einstein); Seeliger and Einstein were both
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addressing the problem of mathematically divergent gravitational potential in an infinite
homogeneous static Newtonian universe. The peculiarity of Λ and its resistance to sensible
interpretations has also been noticed by authors who do not contrast it with a graviton
mass and who do not see its peculiarities as reductios (McCrea, 1971; Kerszberg, 1989). For
massive gravitons one has the plausible form
OP (POT ) + POT = SOURCE,
which is excluded by the narrow schematic equation employed by Einstein with no POT
term permitted.
In the first half of his 1917 paper on the cosmological constant Λ, Einstein briefly enter-
tained what is in effect a massive scalar gravitational theory:
We may ask ourselves the question whether [these difficulties involving the New-
tonian potential in a cosmological context] can be removed by a modification of
the Newtonian theory. First of all we will indicate a method which does not in
itself claim to be taken seriously ; it merely serves as a foil for what is to follow.
In place of Poisson’s equation we write
∇2φ− λφ = 4piκρ . . . (2)
where λ denotes a universal constant. (Einstein, 1923, p. 179)
Thus Einstein in effect contemplated a theory of the sort that, in light of later quantum
mechanics terminology, one might call a theory of gravity using a nonrelativistic massive
scalar field (Boulware and Deser, 1972), with λ equaling the square of the scalar graviton
mass (with ~ = c = 1). Relativistic massive scalar fields in the absence of interacting satisfy
the Klein-Gordon equation, but interpreting the field as gravity introduces interactions,
including self-interaction and hence nonlinearity.
Einstein’s cosmological constant Λ has waxed and waned in its empirical fortunes, but
its plausibility or implausibility vis-a-vis relativistic wave equations has not always been
appreciated. Unfortunately, the dominant effect of Λ is to introduce a constant into the
field equations, like 1
r2
∂
∂r
(
r2 ∂φ
∂r
)
+ C = 0. Widespread historical misunderstanding of this
fact, going back to Einstein in 1917 (Einstein, 1923), has occurred. Such an alteration seems
likely to produce a rather peculiar point mass potential. Indeed it does: the potential grows
quadratically with distance, like a harmonic oscillator (or its opposite, depending on the
sign), and not at all like any fundamental physical force behaves in mundane experience.
(The strong nuclear force is not part of what I mean by mundane experience; intrinsically
nonperturbative theories are different.) The matter was well described by Freund, Mahesh-
wari and Schonberg.
In the “Newtonian” limit it leads to the potential equation,
∆V + Λ = κρ. (1)
Correspondingly, the gravitational potential of a material point of mass M will
be given by
V = −1
2
Λr2 − κM
r
. (2)
A “universal harmonic oscillator” is, so to speak, superposed on the Newton
law. The origin of this extra “oscillator” term is, to say the least, very hard to
understand. (Freund et al., 1969)
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Such a modification, like a graviton mass term, also violates the supposedly fairly generic
template
OP (POT ) = SOURCE
(Renn, 2005; Renn and Sauer, 2007) that Einstein employed in searching for his field equa-
tions, because a cosmological constant involves the gravitational potentials algebraically. For
Λ one has the curious form
OP (POT ) + POT + CONST = SOURCE,
because the gravitational potential/field indicating deviation from triviality is something like
gµν − diag(−1, 1, 1, 1). Both terms POT and CONST are novel, but CONST is abnormal.
Tragically, Einstein conflated these two quite different ideas, Λ and (what we now call) a
graviton mass, in his famous 1917 paper that introduced Λ (Einstein, 1923). Many, many
authors have added a cosmological constant to General Relativity and thought, erroneously,
that they had thereby given the graviton a mass. But it makes all the difference whether the
lowest order algebraic term, which will dominate for weak fields, is zeroth order within the
field equations (first order within the Lagrangian density), as with the cosmological constant,
or first order within the field equations (second order within the Lagrangian density), as with
a mass term. Not only the gross qualitative behavior of the solutions, but also the presence
or absence of gauge freedom, are at issue: mass terms tend to remove gauge freedom in
favor of having more physical degrees of freedom (Pauli and Fierz, 1939; Fierz, 1940). The
cosmological constant Λ does not remove gauge (coordinate) freedom and hence does not
reduce the number of physical degrees of freedom. Hence neglecting the massive possibility
can lead to overconfidence in the existence of a large symmetry group. By conflating the
cosmological constant Λ in General Relativity with (what we now construe as) a graviton
mass, Einstein helped to obscure for himself and others the deep conceptual issues raised by
the mass term.
A substantial portion of 20th century physics was not seriously attended by philosophers
of space-time either at the time or later. According to Wes Salmon, “[d]uring the years
between 1930 and 1950, roughly, little of significance seems to have been achieved in phi-
losophy of space and time.” (Salmon, 1977b, p. 29). While this assessment seems true,
it is no reflection on what physicists were doing. Rather, it says more about how only a
few philosophers were productively involved in studying physics in the 1920s, and then they
stopped. Schlick and Carnap had turned their attention elsewhere well before the end of the
decade (followed by Schlick’s assassination in the 1930s). Even Reichenbach, who paid more
serious technical attention to physics for longer (Reichenbach, 1929b) than one might expect
from reading the truncated English translation of his book (Reichenbach, 1958), quit paying
much attention after c. 1930. So crucial a development as the inclusion of fermions (includ-
ing electrons and, less fundamentally, protons and neutrons)—which Weyl took to be a great
conceptual novelty due to its conclusion of the inadequacy of tensor calculus (Weyl, 1929;
Scholz, 2005)—fell into the period of neglect.5 Given the degree to which space-time philoso-
phy took lasting shape in the late 1910s-20s in the thought and works of Schlick, Reichenbach
5The point that philosophers did not keep up with developments in physics is strengthened, not weak-
ened, by the fact that after Salmon’s period of philosophical stasis, further physical innovations in the
1960s involving nonlinear group realizations, still poorly known even among physicists outside the super-
gravity community, largely deflated Weyl’s result (Ogievetski˘i and Polubarinov, 1965; Isham et al., 1971;
Bilyalov, 2002; Pitts, 2012).
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and Carnap, the fact that Einstein’s false analogy went undetected until 1942 in Germany
(Heckmann, 1942), and was not challenged again until the 1960s, enabled philosophers to
quit paying attention to physics relevant to space-time (but not necessarily primarily about
space-time!) long before the issues were sorted out. This oversight has never been corrected,
not least due to the general relativity vs. particle physics split within physics (on which see
((Feynman et al., 1995; Rovelli, 2002))), a barrier across which little communication occurs,
except through supergravity (Brink, 2006) (and superstrings!) and gauge theories of gravity.
Most philosophers and historians take most of their guidance on space-time from general
relativists, so whatever is best learned from particle physicists is less familiar.
In the actual contingent history, Einstein was unaware of Seeliger’s work until af-
ter the final GR field equations were known (Einstein, 1996, p. 420) (Einstein, 1998,
p. 557) (Einstein, 2002a, pp. 142, 146) (Einstein, 2002b, p. 189). (Pace Earman,
(Earman, 2001), section 30 addressing Seeliger in Einstein’s popular book first ap-
peared in 1918 (Einstein, 1996, p. 420)). When he did discuss the idea in 1917 (not
yet aware of Seeliger’s work) (Einstein, 1923), he drew an analogy between (what
we would call) massive scalar gravity and his cosmological constant Λ term, but a
spurious one (Heckmann, 1942; Trautman, 1965; DeWitt, 1965; Freund et al., 1969;
Treder, 1968; Schucking, 1991; Norton, 1999a; Faraoni and Cooperstock, 1998;
Harvey and Schucking, 2000; Earman, 2001)—an error that would resurface often.
This false analogy—Einstein’s ‘other’ blunder with the cosmological constant (besides the
reportedly self-diagnosed blunder of introducing it in the first place (Gamow, 1970, p.
44))—tends to obscure the possibility of a genuine spin 2 analog to massive scalar gravity.
In 1913 Einstein even enunciated a principle to the effect that the field equations for gravity
should not depend on the absolute value of the gravitational potential(s) (Norton, 1992, p.
72) (Einstein, 2007, pp. 544, 545). It follows immediately that a mass term is not permitted,
but there is little justification for the principle. Modern historians of GR, in the course
of commenting on Einstein’s principle of simplicity (Klein et al., 1995, pp. 501-503), seem
unaware of the fact that Einstein in 1913 thereby excluded both massive scalar gravity and
massive GR from the list of theories that he would entertain. As Norton notes, Einstein’s
refusal to take the modified Poisson equation seriously (Einstein, 1923) is not accompanied
by good reasons (Norton, 1999a). Much of his motivation is his a priori opposition to
absolute inertial coordinate systems (Norton, 2002; Norton, 2007), an opposition that one
can fail to share. Even if one shares it, one loses the possibility of supporting this opinion
by evidence if one refuses to entertain and critique theories that contradict it.
Part of the novelty of the treatment below consists in pointing out how this conflation
lead to total failure until now to recognize the philosophical interest of massive gravity. One
could consider either massive scalar gravity (a cousin to Nordstro¨m’s 1914 theory) or mas-
sive tensor gravity (a cousin to Einstein’s theory). It turns out that there is more than
one massive scalar gravity theory (Pitts, 2011a) and, presumably, more than one massive
tensor gravity (Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Pitts, 2011c; Hassan and Rosen, 2011),
due to the many possibilities for self-interaction (algebraic nonlinear terms), whittled down
to give theories that don’t have certain subtle problems. Massive scalar gravity, which
approximates Nordstro¨m’s theory arbitrarily well for sufficiently small graviton mass, was
thus falsified in 1919 by the bending of light, whether anyone had conceived of it or not.
It was born refuted. Perhaps that is not a rare problem; Lakatos claimed that it is a
“historical fact that most important theories are born refuted” (Lakatos, 1971, p. 114).
Massive scalar gravity will not become an important theory, but its cousin massive spin-2
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gravity perhaps might. Thus since 1919 the problem of unconceived alternatives applies
more properly in terms of massive spin-2 gravity. Massive scalar gravity is easier to under-
stand (a pedagogical virtue for philosophical consumption), indeed much easier to analyze
for working physicists, whose views on the viability of massive tensor gravity shifted radi-
cally for the worse in the early 1970s, gradually improved since 1999, and shifted radically
for the better in 2010, with continuing change since then. Whether or not massive ten-
sor gravity ultimately makes sense (an outcome which is difficult to judge in 2015 due to
the rapid pace of physical development), massive scalar gravity clearly does make sense. It
has plenty of lessons for what space-time could have been like, as well as interesting, cur-
rently plausible suggestions for what space-time in fact might be like—to the degree that
massive tensor gravity works and insofar as massive tensor gravity is analogous to massive
scalar gravity (a presumptive analogy that can fail in surprising ways requiring the rein-
stallation of gauge freedom (Pitts and Schieve, 2007)!). Hence right now there is a great
deal to learn about space-time philosophy from massive scalar gravity. The field seems
to be entirely open. The only near-exceptions that come to mind displaying philosophi-
cal awareness of massive gravity (apart from ((Pitts, 2011a; Pitts, 2011b))) is some 1970s
work by Peter Mittelstaedt (Mittelstaedt, 1970). But even Mittelstaedt merely described
the graviton mass merely as an empirical parameter that might be 0, not as a conceptual
watershed as it should be seen, and as some physicists recognized (Freund et al., 1969). Fur-
thermore, massive gravitons shortly ran into serious trouble (van Dam and Veltman, 1970;
van Dam and Veltman, 1972; Boulware and Deser, 1972). Recently the tide has turned
and massive graviton theories have become a ‘small industry’ (de Rham et al., 2011;
Hassan and Rosen, 2012; Hassan and Rosen, 2011; Hinterbichler, 2012; de Rham, 2014).
Whether or not massive spin-2 gravity survives as a viable theory and rival to General
Relativity, progress will have been made by exploring serious alternatives.
Particle physics would enable historians of General Relativity to ask questions that they
tend not to ask, such as why Einstein did not seriously consider massive gravities (despite
eventually (p)reinventing massive scalar gravity in 1917, in a sense). Developments in group
theory as applied to relativistic quantum mechanics, such as by Wigner (Wigner, 1939;
Bargmann and Wigner, 1948), classified all possible fields in terms of the Lorentz group
with various masses and various spins. (Merely the words that are quantum mechanical;
the concepts are just classical field theory. Avoiding the quantum words involves using
c. 5 times as many syllables.) As noted above, relativistic massive scalar fields, if non-
interacting, satisfy the Klein-Gordon equation (−∂2t +∇2 −m2)φ = 0, where the speed of
light and Planck’s constant have been set to 1. Massive fields with spins higher than 0 also
tend to satisfy the Klein-Gordon equation as a consequence of logically stronger equations
of motion. Given particle physicists’ taxonomy in terms of mass and spin, it is natural to
look for and to fill in the blanks by considering all the possibilities, as the table suggests.
The table omits half-integral spins, which have to be fermions by the spin-statistics theorem,
and hence do not accumulate into powerful classical forces. It also omits higher spins, which
cannot produce long-range forces due to the lack of suitable conserved currents to which
they could couple (Weinberg, 1995, p. 253).
Mass-Spin Taxonomy Exemplified
Spin 0 Spin 1 Spin 2
m = 0 Nordstro¨m Maxwell Einstein
m 6= 0 ? de Broglie-Proca ?
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In the late 1930s Pauli and Fierz found that the theory of a non-interacting massless spin
2 (symmetric tensor) field in Minkowski space-time was just the linear approximation of
Einstein’s GR (Pauli and Fierz, 1939; Fierz and Pauli, 1939; Wentzel, 1949). Tonnelat and
Petiau, associated with de Broglie pursued massive spin 2 theories (cited above). Tonnelat
cited Fierz (Tonnelat, 1941d; Fierz, 1939). Thus by the end of the 1930s, the idea of a
graviton mass was available not merely by analogy to electromagnetism, or the older non-
relativistic work by Neumann, Seeliger, and Einstein, but in detailed relativistic work in
several papers by a leading physicist (Pauli) with gravity as one intended application, with
follow-on work in France encouraged by de Broglie in the early 1940s.
Nordstro¨m’s theory of a long-range scalar field is, in this particle physics terminology ap-
plied retrospectively, a theory of a massless spin 0 field; thus when one considers Nordstro¨m’s
theory, it is natural to consider a massive variant and to ascertain whether the massless limit
of the massive theory is smooth. If it is, then the massive variant serves as a rival to the
massless theory, implying a case of underdetermination of theories by data. As Boulware
and Deser put it, there is a
basic principle, physical continuity, which demands that a theory be “stable” in
its predictions, i.e., no more isolated from nearby models than our finite obser-
vations warrant. In particular, a good theory of long-range forces should have a
smooth limit as the range tends to infinity, and this limit should agree with the
strictly infinite-range model. This viewpoint has been forcefully stated for elec-
trodynamics by Schro¨dinger,6 and it has been amply demonstrated by analysis of
massive vector theory [references suppressed] that approximate gauge invariance
is not the contradiction it first seems. (Boulware and Deser, 1972)
(This was not their final view in light of the new Yang-Mills and gravity cases, but it sets up
the appropriate expectation in terms of particle physics knowledge through the 1960s, which
is progress.) Massive scalar gravities, if the mass is sufficiently small, fit the data as well as
does Nordstro¨m’s theory, as a consequence of the smoothness of the limit of a massive scalar
field theory as the mass goes to zero (Weinberg, 1995, p. 246) (Boulware and Deser, 1972).
Thus there is a problem of underdetermination between the massless theory and its massive
variants for sufficiently small masses (Pitts, 2011b).
This instance of underdetermination, apart from framing in terms of particle mass, was
already clearly anticipated by Seeliger in the 1890s. He wrote (as translated by John Norton)
that Newton’s law was “a purely empirical formula and assuming its exactness would be a
new hypothesis supported by nothing.” (von Seeliger, 1895; Norton, 1999a) That claim is
too strong, in that Newton’s law had virtues that not every rival formula empirically viable
in the 1890s had. But a certain kind of exponentially decaying formula was associated with
an appropriate differential equation and hence had theoretical credentials comparable to
Newton’s (Pockels, 1891; Neumann, 1896), vindicating the spirit of Seeliger’s point. The
idea of exploring whether a massive theory could work in place of a massless one (or vice
versa), much as Seeliger proposed, is a commonplace in particle physics.
The massless vs. massive competition is an especially interesting and well motivated
example of the fact, noted by Pierre Duhem, that the curve fitting problem always applies
in physics: through any set of experimental results (especially with error bars!), multiple
curves can be proposed as the correct theory. Two consecutive section headings from the
6Reference to (Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955).
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famous part II, chapter 5 of Duhem’s book make the point: “A Law of Physics Is, Properly
Speaking, neither True nor False but Approximate” and “Every Law of Physics Is Provisional
and Relative because It Is Approximate” (Duhem, 1954, pp. 168, 172). There are many
ways that a given body of data can be fit by a theoretical formula, but Duhem expects
that generally a choice of one option will be made on the basis of good sense. However, the
competition between massive and massless theories is one that good sense does not settle, in
that both competitors are taken seriously by particle physicists until reason to the contrary is
found (Boulware and Deser, 1972). While successes of the “gauge principle” since the early
1970s are noteworthy and encourage gauge freedom and masslessness for spins high enough
to imply gauge freedom (≥ 1), the moderately surprising and fairly recently learned fact
that at least some neutrinos are massive (Roy, 2000; Bilenky, 2010) serves as a reminder not
to neglect massive theories. Spin 0 and spin 1
2
particles have no negative-energy lower spin
degrees of freedom that one might want to get rid of via gauge freedom, because one cannot
take a divergence or trace to make lower spin. Thus the gauge principle does not apply.
Logically speaking, mass terms are children not of quantum theory or whatever quantum
‘particles’ might be, but of special relativity, the idea that ponderable matter is made of fields
(arising from ideas of Mie, Hilbert and Jordan), and daily experience. Whether or not one
has the particle-related concept of a particle mass, it is empirically obvious that most stuff
doesn’t move at the speed of light or look like standing waves made from oppositely-directed
waves moving at the speed of light, for example. Thus one has an overwhelming empirical
motive to look for classical relativistic wave equations with dispersion and the possibility of
having the bulk of matter be motionless in some reference frame. Thus the introduction of
the ∂
2
∂t2
terms due to relativity does much to motivate the algebraic terms.
3 Massive Scalar Gravity Is Just Special Relativistic
Features of Nordstro¨m’s scalar gravity are said to have shown that even the simplest and
most conservative relativistic field theory of gravitation had to burst the bounds of Special
Relativity (SR) (Misner et al., 1973, pp. 179, 187-189) (Norton, 1992, p. 19). Relativistic
gravity couldn’t be merely special relativistic, according to these claims. Nordstro¨m’s theory
indeed has a merely conformally flat space-time geometry (Einstein and Fokker, 1914), and
it arguably is the simplest and most conservative option. But how do such claims fare in
light of the broader range of possibilities of particle physics (or Neumann-Seeliger-Einstein),
especially with a graviton mass term as an option?
The best way to write the conformally flat geometry—well adapted to ontology by attend-
ing to Ockham’s razor (no gratuitous introduction of volume elements that one doesn’t want
and conformal transformations to cancel them out)—involves breaking a metric into its irre-
ducible parts. (For irreducible geometric objects in differential geometry, see ((Zajtz, 1966;
Stachel, 2002))). Having become familiar with the irreducible parts, their physical meanings,
and how to do tensor calculus with them, one can then take them to be primitive, regarding
the metric as derived, if it exists at all. One can use one part without the other, swap one
part out and replace it with a different one of the same sort, introduce two or more of the
same type, etc.
It is a classical result that one can define a tensor density that precisely picks out the
conformal part of a metric, excising any information about volumes. According to Kentaro
Yano in 1939,
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. . .M. T. Y. Thomas2) a introduit, en 1925, une densite´ tensorielle du poids − 2
n
(0.4) Gij = gij/g
1
n
ou` g est le de´terminant forme´ avec les gij. (Yano, 1939, p. 72)
The reference is to ((Thomas, 1925)); the work ((Thomas, 1926)) further explored such
matters. This tensor density has a dimension-dependent and (for dimension 3 or greater)
fractional density weight (poids). It follows that the determinant of Thomas’s quantity Gij
(which I write with a caret as gˆµν , partly by association with the unit vectors of vector
calculus) is 1 for the positive definite case, or −1 for space-time, in all coordinate sys-
tems. Densities of arbitrary weight seem to be due to Veblen and Thomas (who called them
relative tensors) (Veblen and Thomas, 1924) and to Weyl (Weyl, 1925) (Hawkins, 2000, p.
462). Densities acquire an extra weight-related term7 in their Lie and covariant derivatives
(Veblen and Thomas, 1924; Schouten, 1954; Anderson, 1967). Differential geometry in the
modern style has tended to employ Weyl’s conformal rescalings rather than Thomas’s more
direct and economical characterization of conformal geometry, a tendency critiqued (without
the historical context) by Calderbank and Pedersen:
As counterpoint to the tendency to do conformal geometry in a Riemannian
framework, we would like to suggest that a conformal structure is more funda-
mental than a Riemannian structure by defining the latter in terms of the former.
(Calderbank and Pedersen, 1999, p. 391)
Branson comments that Thomas’s work was largely forgotten until the 1990s
(Branson, 2005, p. 180). This forgetting seems to refer to mathematicians (apart from
(Schouten and Haantjes, 1936; Yano, 1939; Haantjes, 1941)), because physicists often re-
membered (Peres, 1963; Anderson, 1967; Anderson and Finkelstein, 1971; Unruh, 1989)).
Writing Thomas’s equation for a flat metric tensor ηµν (not that flatness affects this
decomposition), one has
ηˆµν = ηµν(−η)− 14 (1)
after specializing to n = 4 space-time dimensions. One can invert to express the metric
in terms of its irreducible parts, the conformal (angle-related) part ηˆµν and the (unsigned)
volume element
√−η :
ηµν = ηˆµν
√−η 12 . (2)
One now can and should think of ηˆµν and
√−η as independent entities in their own right.
ηˆµν describes a conformally flat geometry—perhaps one should say a flat conformal geometry,
flat in the same of vanishing Weyl curvature tensor, “conformal geometry” to emphasize that
it isn’t a geometry that defines distances. The 15-parameter conformal group first studied by
Bateman and Cunningham (Bateman, 1909; Cunningham, 1910; Bateman, 1910) is just the
group of generalized Killing vectors for ηˆµν , the vectors for which it has 0 Lie derivative. ηˆµν
determines the light cones just as if for a flat metric in SR. Note that there is nothing “flat”
about
√−η, because one volume element is like another. The flatness of ηµν , insofar as it goes
beyond the (conformal) flatness of ηˆµν , is due to a relation between ηˆµν and
√−η rather than
a property of
√−η. Using a volume element one can define a “volume connection,” a term
7It is perhaps unfortunate linguistically that one has to distinguish, besides the ordinary mass of heavy
objects and the associated weight that one determines using a bathroom scale, the unrelated idea of a
graviton mass and the further unrelated mathematical idea of density weight.
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due to ((Coleman and Korte´, 1994)). The entity is familiar as the trace of the Christoffel
symbols, but it is a gradient and hence has 0 curvature, the ‘other’ trace of the Riemann
tensor, which one usually takes to vanish.
One can write Nordstro¨m’s theory geometrically, as Einstein and Fokker showed
(Einstein and Fokker, 1914). One can write it more economically using a Thomas-style de-
composition with no surplus structure:
gµν = ηˆµν
√−g 12 . (3)
√−g includes the influence of gravity. One could derive √−g by combining the gravita-
tional potential with
√−η (Kraichnan, 1955; Deser and Halpern, 1970; Pitts, 2011a); for
Nordstro¨m’s theory, such a derivation is a plausible heuristic but ultimately perhaps not
illuminating, in that
√−η does nothing by itself in the final theory (at least not locally)—
like a Poincare´-Reichenbach universal force. Because the only non-variational field in the
theory’s Lagrangian density is ηˆµν , the symmetry group of the non-variational fields is the
15-parameter conformal group, a larger group than the usual 10-parameter Poincare´ group
of Special Relativity, thus admitting a larger class of preferred coordinate systems than do
paradigmatic special relativistic theories. Thus not all the structure of Minkowski space-
time is exhibited, and the effective geometry seen by rods and clocks is curved and only
conformally flat (Misner et al., 1973, pp. 179, 187-189) (Norton, 1992, p. 19).
But massive variants of Nordstro¨m’s theory contain both
√−g and √−η in the mass term
and so are merely Poincare´-invariant, hence strictly special relativistic, as far as symmetries
are concerned. Rods and clocks are distorted by gravity, and in a way that can be empirically
ascertained due to the mass term. The difference in symmetry group of the non-variational
(that is, not varied in the principle of least action (Gotay et al., 2004; Pitts, 2006)) objects
reflects the difference in non-variational objects present in the Lagrangian density. Because
of the graviton mass term, massive scalar gravities have the full flat background metric ηµν in
the Lagrangian density (Pitts, 2011a). Thus the Lagrangian has only the symmetries of ηµν ,
10 Killing vectors (4 translations, 6 boost-rotations). By contrast in the (massless) Nord-
stro¨m theory, only the conformal part of a flat metric, ηˆµν , is present in the Lagrangian den-
sity. Consequently the symmetries are the conformal Killing vector fields, those such that the
Lie derivative of the conformal metric density8 vanishes (Schouten, 1954; Anderson, 1967):
£ξηˆµν = ξ
α ∂
∂xα
ηˆµν + ηˆµα
∂
∂xν
ξα + ηˆαν
∂
∂xµ
ξα − 1
2
ηˆµν
∂
∂xα
ξα. (4)
Because a scalar graviton mass term breaks the 15-parameter conformal symme-
try and leaves only the 10-parameter Poicare´ symmetry, it is therefore false, pace
((Misner et al., 1973, p. 179, 187-9) (Norton, 1992, p. 19)), that relativistic gravitation
could not have fit within the confines of Special Relativity as construed to require exhibit-
ing the full Minkowski space-time structure. While it is true that no phenomena required
the mass term, it was epistemically possible that the mere smallness of the mass parameter
explained its empirical obscurity, as Seeliger had already proposed in the Newtonian case.
Indeed it is still possible, or rather again possible (after seeming impossible since the early
8 One often sees the conformal Killing equation in terms of an arbitrary metric in a conformal equivalence
class and require that the Lie derivative of such a metric be proportional to that metric, £ξηµν ∼ ηµν , as
if it weren’t known how to isolate the relevant piece. But Thomas showed how in the 1920s; the arbitrary
volume element is no more relevant to conformal Killing vector fields than is the aether to Special Relativity.
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1970s), that a tensorial analog of this issue exists today. Something similar happened with
neutrinos a few years back, one recalls.
4 Massive Gravities, Laws, Geometry, and Explana-
tion
A recent debate among philosophers of physics, albeit one with striking similarities to older
debates about conventionality, pertains to the explanatory priority of space-time structure
vs. the field equations satisfied by fields on space-time. Harvey Brown has recently defended
the latter view (Brown, 2005; Brown, 2009), known by terms such as constructive relativity
or physical relativity. While the former view has an undeniable economy and provides
in some respects a natural classification—for example, Einstein’s General Relativity and
theories involving higher powers of the Riemann tensor clearly have some natural affinities—
consideration of massive theories of gravity reveals that space-time structure, construed as
a list of geometric object fields defined on a manifold, is either too narrow or unhelpfully
vague (Freund et al., 1969).
If there is more than one metric—and why shouldn’t there be, if one’s imagination is fueled
by mathematics after the 1910s (Levi-Civita, 1926, chapter 8)?—much of the phenomenology
is unspecified until the field equations are introduced. Even with the modest ingredients of
a flat space-time metric and a scalar gravitational potential, uncountably infinitely many
theories can be written down due to the possibilities for a mass term, at least a one-parameter
family (Pitts, 2011a; Pitts, 2011b) but likely more. Indeed one can derive the full nonlinear
Lagrangian density for a universally coupled massive scalar gravity theory using a relation
of the form
g˜ =
√−gw = √−ηw + 8w
√
piGγ˜,
where γ˜ is the gravitational potential and w is an arbitrary real number (the case w =
0 requiring special care). If one already has the Lagrangian density in hand, then one
is more interested in whether one can write it using only a combined quantity such as√−g, or whether one needs both √−g and √−η. The kinetic term (with time and space
derivatives of the potential) is just that of Nordstro¨m’s theory and so can be written in
terms of
√−g only; thus Nordstro¨m’s theory is geometrizable. The graviton mass term
can be written in terms of the effective volume element
√−g (with volumes distorted by
gravity) and also the undistorted volume element
√−η of the flat metric. The fact that√−η appears by itself, not merely hidden within √−g clothed by γ, implies most of what is
conceptually interesting about massive scalar gravity vis-a-vis Nordstro¨m’s theory, blocking
the usual criticisms of universal forces as superfluous. This 1-parameter family of massive
scalar gravities is analogous to the 2-parameter family of massive spin-2 gravities proposed in
1965 as variants of General Relativity (Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965). The scalar case
has the advantages of technical simplicity and immunity to the difficulties that have at times
(especially 1972-c. 1999 or 2010) afflicted massive spin-2 gravity. It isn’t very profitable
to ask what the gravitational potential is in relation to
√−g and √−η, because after the
linear term, the answer is merely a conventional choice. (For the expression above, the answer
depends on w.) In fact that freedom to use a variety of field (re)definitions is a crucial resource
in the derivations (Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Pitts and Schieve, 2007; Pitts, 2011c;
Pitts, 2011a; Pitts, 2015). Linearity is convenient; equivocating about the meaning of the
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quantity in which an expression is linear lets one discuss infinitely many theories at once.
That is much faster than trying to derive an uncountable infinity of theories one at a time,
and much more general than deriving only one theory as in ((Freund and Nambu, 1968;
Freund et al., 1969)). The parameter w is the density weight of the gravitational potential
under coordinate transformations used in the initial derivation.
For any real w (using l’Hoˆpital’s rule for w = 0 or w = 1), a universally coupled massive
theory is given by (Pitts, 2011a)
L = LNord + m
2
64piG
[ √−g
w − 1 +
√−gw√−η1−w
w(1− w) −
√−η
w
]
.
(5)
One can express this mass term as a quadratic term in the potential and, typically, a series of
higher powers using the expansion
√−gw = √−ηw + 8w√piGγ˜, where γ˜ is the gravitational
potential. Different values of w thus give different definitions of the gravitational potential
(disagreeing at second or higher order). If one takes the wth root and then takes the limit
w → 0, the limit is √−g = √−ηexp(8
√
piGγ).
An exponential change of variables very much like this was already employed by Kraichnan,
though without application to massive theories (Kraichnan, 1955).
It can be useful to rewrite the continuous family of massive scalar gravities given above
using this exponential relationship; this definition of γ is somewhat ecumenical. The result
is
Lms = m
2√−η
64piG
[we8γ
√
piG − e8wγ
√
piG + 1− w]
w(w − 1) ; (6)
the special cases w = 0 and w = 1 readily handled by l’Hoˆpital’s rule. Using the series
expansion for the exponential function, which converges everywhere, one has, reassuringly,
a series involving quadratic (mass) and higher (self-interaction) terms:
Lms = −m
2
√−η
64piG
∞∑
j=2
(8γ
√
piG)j
j!
1− wj−1
1− w =
−m
2γ2
√−η
2
− 4m
2
√
piG(1 + w)
3
γ3 + . . . . (7)
A given massive scalar gravity, such as for a specific value of w from the family above, is
either not the manifestation of any geometry, or is just one of many possible manifestations
of the geometry comprised of two metrics, one flat and one conformally related to it. Thus a
dynamics-first approach to relativity, or something like it, is appropriate (Brown, 2005, Ch.
9 and Appendix A)—and one can see this from examples that could have been, and almost
were, invented in the 1910s. One could hardly claim that space-time’s being flat, conformally
flat, bimetric, or whatever it is in these massive scalar gravity theories, provides a ready ex-
planation of the detailed phenomenology exhibited by the field equations, because, among
other reasons, the geometry does not pick out a value of w. In this respect, the recently
derived infinity of scalar gravities marks a conceptual advance over the derivation of only
one (Freund and Nambu, 1968), an advance that could be anticipated by consideration of
the massive spin 2 analogs (Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965). Neither does the arguable
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existence of Minkowski space-time explain why rods and clocks exhibit Minkowskian be-
havior as Norton expects (Norton, 2008), because they don’t exhibit Minkowski behavior.
Rods and clocks, if they exhibit any unique geometry, exhibit the geometry to which mat-
ter couples; thus one can inspect the matter Lagrangian and see that rods and clocks do
not exhibit Minkowski geometry. As Norton elsewhere urges, the philosophy of geometry
is not an enterprise rightly devoted to giving a spurious air of necessity to whatever theory
is presently our best (Norton, 1993, pp. 848, 849). So merely possible theories, especially
those that are so similar to realistic physics and readily derived using well motivated prin-
ciples, should be entertained when assessing issues of the explanatory priority of laws vs.
geometry (Brown, 2005, Ch. 9 and Appendix A), or, for that matter, the conventionality vs.
empirical factuality of geometry. Yet critiques of Brown’s work routinely default to single-
metric theories, or more specifically even to “our best scientific theory.” Strikingly, a similar
omission occurred in the 1970s critiques of Gru¨nbaum’s conventionality of geometry thesis,
as will appear below. In taking laws as prior to geometry, I do not mean to imply that laws
are entirely free of geometrical presuppositions, but that geometry is adequately encoded in
the laws (such as in the Lagrangian density) in any theory, but it in most theories it is not
adequately described by a list of geometric objects.9 Massive scalar gravity(s) show that this
inadequacy extends even into what one might describe as Special Relativity or Minkowski
space-time.
5 Massive Scalar Gravity as Violating Einstein’s Prin-
ciples
The mathematical-philosophical side of Einstein’s process of discovery for General Relativ-
ity involved various Principles: general relativity, general covariance, equivalence, and Mach.
(For a brief useful history of the principles, including how Mach’s principle was split off from
the principle of general relativity, see ((Lehner, 2005)).) Part of the interest of massive scalar
gravity, like massive variants of General Relativity (Freund et al., 1969), is that though mas-
sive scalar gravities are perfectly sensible special relativistic field theories, they violate all of
Einstein’s principles, at least in the robust senses in which Einstein used them to derive sub-
stantive conclusions. Massive scalar gravities admit the inertial references frames of special
relativity but no larger set of reference frames, contrary to the principle of general relativity.
Massive scalar gravities privilege the Poincare´ transformations as relating preferred coordi-
nate systems, while arbitrary coordinate systems are admissible only using tensor calculus
to introduce fudge factors such as the metric tensor and Christoffel symbols, contrary to the
stronger and more interesting (as opposed to purely formal) sense of general covariance in
which the metric tensor and Christoffel symbols don’t enter simply to correct for failure to
employ the privileged Cartesian coordinates. Massive scalar gravities distinguish between
gravitation and inertia, because inertia is characterized by the flat metric tensor, while the
gravitational potential is a distinct scalar (density) field. Thus the principle of equivalence
(read strongly as the identification of gravity and inertia, or a bit more weakly as the claim
that gravity and inertia have the same effects10) fails for massive scalar gravity, though em-
pirically the difference between gravity and inertia is observable only in experiments sensitive
9I thank a referee for helping to formulate this point.
10I thank a referee for pointing out that this weaker claim also fails.
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to the graviton mass term and hence involving long distances. In massive scalar gravity, con-
trary to Machian expectations, inertia has a core that is absolute and given from above, but
gravity also modifies inertia somewhat; the core can be distinguished if one is looks carefully
enough to observe the influence of the mass term in the gravitational field equation. In short,
massive scalar gravity shows how readily conceivable is the failure of most or all of Einstein’s
principles in the strong interesting senses, and hence how frail a justification for Einstein’s
equations must be if it relies on such principles as premises. A similar point has been made
by Luc Blanchet (Blanchet, 1992). According to Robert DiSalle,
Einstein thought that anyone who followed the philosophical steps that he had
taken, whatever their [sic] scientific background, would be convinced of the basic
principles of special and general relativity. By the later twentieth century, how-
ever, philosophers came to think of those steps as somewhat arbitrary, and as not
very clearly related to the theories that Einstein actually produced. They had a
heuristic value for Einstein, and may have again for a future theory of space-time.
To believe again that such philosophical arguments could be crucial—not only
to the motivation for a theory, but also to its real significance in our scientific
understanding of the world— we need a more philosophically subtle and histori-
cally realistic account of those arguments, and the peculiar roles that philosophy
and physics have played in them. (DiSalle, 2006, p. xi)
Norton on occasion has felt the need to try to dispel the mystical air surrounding many com-
mon justifications for Einstein’s equations by seeking eliminative inductions (Norton, 1995).
Violating Einstein’s principles with a theory that was empirically falsified in 1919 due
to the bending of light might seem to set the bar too low. Who cares if a wildly obsolete
and wrong theory violates Einstein’s principles? One should care because so much of what
one learns about massive scalar (spin-0) gravity has a good chance of being true also about
massive spin-2 (tensor) gravity also. Hence one needs to consider massive spin-2 gravity
and show that either it doesn’t work, or that it isn’t like massive scalar gravity in the given
respect after all, or else one should anticipate violating the strong interesting versions of
Einstein’s principle with a currently adequate theory.
By contrast Peter van Nieuwenhuizen could describe roughly what philosophers would call
an eliminative induction leading to Einstein’s theory. Having moved beyond scalar theories
(which do not bend light), the next option for gravity is a symmetric rank 2 tensor (spin
2). Recalling that “ghosts” are negative-energy degrees of freedom, which are expected to
produce instability, while tachyons move faster than light and hence should be excluded to
preserve the usual relativistic notion of causality,
[t]he conclusions are that the only tensor theories without ghosts or tachyons,
which contain spin two, are linear Einstein theory and [massive] Fierz-Pauli
theory. Hence, the gauge invariance and locality of gravitation follow from
the absence of ghosts and need no longer be postulated separately [refer-
ence to (Sexl, 1967; Nachtmann et al., 1968; Nachtmann et al., 1969)], and gen-
eral relativity follows from special relativity by excluding ghosts [reference to
(Deser, 1970)]. Also it follows that any linear or non-linear theory of gravita-
tion has a discontinuous mass limit*. [footnote to (Boulware and Deser, 1972)]
(van Nieuwenhuizen, 1973).
At a time when historians of General Relativity have made a detailed study of Einstein’s
notebooks from c. 1914 (Janssen and Renn, 2007; Renn and Sauer, 2007) that has shown
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the importance of his physical strategy involving energy-momentum conservation and the
analogy to electromagnetism, it is striking to see both how similar the later particle physics
work is in general outline and how much more compelling the later argumentation is. A
key ingredient added by particle physicists is testing for ghosts. It seems not to have been
noticed that Einstein’s Entwurf theory is full of ghosts. Even with that powerful new test,
van Nieuwenhuizen’s claim is a bit too quick: besides massive spin-2 gravity, which seemed
freshly falsified (at least empirically, if not a priori) when he wrote but has experienced
a revival since 2010, one could also include unimodular General Relativity (like General
Relativity with a solution-dependent cosmological constant) and slightly bimetric theories
(Pitts and Schieve, 2001) (like scalar-tensor theories with a solution-dependent cosmological
constant). These theories are all closely related to Einstein’s theory, however, so at least one
arrives near Einstein’s theory in many respects, including nonlinear terms.
Massive scalar gravities are not geometrizable in the usual sense: there is no way to absorb
fully the gravitational potential into the geometry of space-time, at least if one does not
permit multiple volume elements. The mass term depends on both
√−g that contains the
gravitational influence and
√−η, which contains no gravitational influence. Massive scalar
gravity, like Seeliger-Neumann-Einstein ‘massive’ Newtonian theory, makes a distinction
between the space-time geometry and the gravitational field, albeit a subtle one. By contrast
Newtonian gravity in the geometrized Newton-Cartan form, Nordstro¨m scalar gravity in
geometrized Einstein-Fokker form, and General Relativity in its usual form combine the
gravitational influence and space-time geometry such that neither gravity nor any supposed
originally flat geometry appears separately. If one permits more than one volume element in
scalar gravity, then one can have any dependence whatsoever on the gravitational potential,
making geometrization toothless and purely formal rather than substantive. The same holds
for multiple metrics, multiple connections, etc.: one could easily hide a gravitational potential
(or its gradient) as the difference between them. Massive scalar gravities contain both the
conformally flat metric gµν = ηˆµν
√−g 12 of Nordstro¨m’s theory (as geometrized by Einstein
and Fokker (Einstein and Fokker, 1914) and improved with help from T. Y. Thomas) and
the flat metric ηµν = ηˆµν
√−η 12 of SR. (Massive Newtonian gravity, that is, Neumann-
Seeliger-Einstein gravity, is not geometrizable either.) Because there are two metrics present
(albeit conformally related), one has a good argument for the conventionality of geometry,
as Poincare´ envisaged (on which more below). For the same reasons, strong versions of
the equivalence principle are not admissible; gravity is not a feature of space-time geometry,
though it looks that way unless one makes sufficiently precise measurements involving cosmic
distances due to the smallness of the graviton mass. It is only the empirical fact of the
bending of light by gravity, not any inherent conceptual defect, that made it impossible
to treat gravity adequately as a special relativistic theory of a massive scalar field (c.f.
(Giulini, 2007; Giulini, 2008)). Had Nordstro¨m’s theory still been viable by the time that
Wigner’s classification of Lorentz group representations in terms of mass and spin was widely
known, it seems certain that massive scalar gravity would have been considered. Its neglect
until 1968 (Freund and Nambu, 1968; Delbourgo et al., 1969; Deser and Halpern, 1970), if
not the present, is one of the many disadvantages from the well known gulf (Rovelli, 2002;
Feynman et al., 1995) between general relativists and particle physicists. The precedent
that should have been noticed for massive scalar gravity suggests by analogy that one could
consider massive tensor gravity as well.
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6 Conventionalism vs. Empiricism, Ehlers-Pirani-
Schild, and Poincare´’s Modal Argument
Mathematicians have recently found it worthwhile to study what one can do with a metric
and an additional volume element, under the name “metric-measure space” (Lott, 2003).
Such a framework fits the well known Brans-Dicke scalar-tensor theory and various related
theories (Brans and Dicke, 1961), hence is not very new. In fact such possibilities, in the
simplest cases, are more than a century old. Poincare´ envisaged the possibility of a theory
in which more than one metric played a role and saw this possibility as motivating the con-
ventionality of geometry (Poincare´, 1913, pp. 88, 89) (Ben-Menahem, 2001). Let us call this
“Poincare´’s modal argument for the conventionality of geometry.” To assess this argument,
one needs to be a bit clearer than usual about the main competition of the same era, em-
piricism. In important respects the old empiricism vs. conventionalism debate of the 1920s
(such as Eddington vs. Poincare´ (Eddington, 1920)) has been recapitulated by the realism
vs. conventionalism debate of the 1970s (such as Putnam, Stein, Earman and Friedman vs.
Gru¨nbaum) and the recent realism vs. constructivism debate (Norton, 2008; Brown, 2005).
In all three cases a more or less unrecognized issue leading the two sides to talk past each
other was a disagreement about modal scope, with the conventionalist/constructivist side
envisaging a broad modal scope and hence discussing alternative theories, and the empiri-
cist/realist side considering primarily ‘our best theory,’ General Relativity. Given that the
two sides (if the reader will accept my amalgamation of conventionalism and constructivism,
and of empiricism and realism, for present purposes) have asked different questions, it be-
comes less surprising that the answers differed, and more plausible that both views contain
important insights. Despite criticisms of conventionalism (Norton, 1994) and constructivism
(Norton, 2008), Norton has urged (as noted above) that the philosophy of geometry is not an
enterprise rightly devoted to giving a spurious air of necessity to whatever theory is presently
our best (Norton, 1993, pp. 848, 849).
Empiricism comes in two different senses relevant to geometry. The broader sense involves
the revisability in principle of even deeply entrenched and intuitively plausible ideas and the
entertainment of as many options as possible in light of experience, as opposed to apriorism.
Empiricism in this sense is, in my view, a good idea. Geometric empiricism, by contrast, in-
volves the claim that the geometry of space(time) can and should be ascertained empirically,
but it came to mean something stronger. In Helmholtz’s time, geometric empiricism was
still an instance of empiricism in the broader sense. But the progress of mathematics from
1898 made a flat metric together with conformally related curved metric (agreeing on an-
gles but not volumes) available (Cotton, 1898; Cotton, 1899; Poincare´, 1913; Finzi, 1903;
Fubini, 1905; Weyl, 1918; Schouten and Struik, 1919; Schouten, 1921; Finzi, 1922;
Finzi, 1923; Kasner, 1921; Kasner, 1922; Brinkmann, 1923; Struik, 1922; Schouten, 1924;
Levi-Civita, 1926; Schouten and Struik, 1938), and indeed fairly common in 3 dimensions,
in French, Italian and German, and eventually in English. Thus Poincare´ the philosopher-
mathematician was aware of the possibility of there being no specific fact of the matter
about geometry (Poincare´, 1913, pp. 88, 89) (Ben-Menahem, 2001). Just this possibility,
upgraded from space to space-time, is realized physically massive scalar gravities. The ge-
ometric empiricism of Eddington (Eddington, 1920, p. 10) (Eddington, 1928, pp. 159-162),
by contrast, had hardened into a dogma. It did so by presupposing that there exists a
unique geometry—long after alternatives to that presupposition were available, as even his
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own work on affine gravity suggests (Eddington, 1921; Goenner, 2004). Later geometric em-
piricism thus rejected a priori such theories as might not have a unique geometry. The
tendency is to freeze the development of mathematics and of the physics that employs it in
the 1910s. By stopping history early, one can make General Relativity appear as the end of
it.
Whereas physicists aware of the particle physics tradition often incline toward
conventionalism (Feynman et al., 1995; Freund et al., 1969; Sexl, 1970; Weinberg, 1972)
and sometimes employ multiple metrics due to a graviton mass in particular
(Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Freund et al., 1969), philosophical works aiming to
refute conventionalism tend not to address particle physics or multi-geometry the-
ories (Earman, 1970; Friedman, 1972; Putnam, 1975b; Spirtes, 1981; Friedman, 1983;
Torretti, 1996; Coleman and Korte´, 1990; Norton, 1994). (A partial exception is
((Stein, 1977)).) From the broad modal perspective, single-geometry theories such as
Newtonian physics, Special Relativity, Nordstro¨m’s theory, and General Relativity, are
a special and somewhat degenerate case, albeit one of great importance as well as con-
venience. Single-geometry theories are the home turf of geometric empiricism (and its
later cousin realism). In that context the massless spin 2 particle physics derivations
(Kraichnan, 1955; Gupta, 1954; Feynman et al., 1995; Freund et al., 1969; Deser, 1970;
Pitts and Schieve, 2001; Ben-Menahem, 2006) achieve rough parity for conventionalism via
something like a demonstrative and eliminative induction for Einstein’s equations starting
from a field theory in flat space-time. Conventionalism about geometry indeed would be dis-
appointing if universal forces were the conventionalist’s only or main idea, as sometimes is
suggested. But on the contrary, universal forces are rather the response to the hardest cases
for conventionalism, cases where it is meaningful to talk about the geometry of space(time).
Thus Norton’s critique of Reichenbach’s conventionalism and universal forces speaks of “the
[metric] revealed by direct measurement” (Norton, 1994, 159) and “the [metric] revealed by
uncorrected distance measurements.” (Norton, 1994, p. 166) But why must there be any
such thing? Reichenbach (Reichenbach, 1928, appendix only in the German original)11 and
Gru¨nbaum (below) had already seen in metric-affine theories the possible nonexistence of
such a thing.
The difficulty can now be seen in the longstanding and sophisticated Coleman-
Korte´ argument for the non-conventionality of geometry (Coleman and Korte´, 1980;
Coleman and Korte, 1982; Coleman and Korte´, 1984; Coleman and Korte´, 1995a;
Coleman and Korte´, 1995b; Coleman and Korte´, 2001; Bell and Korte´, 2011) from the
Ehlers-Pirani-Schild (EPS) construction. Purged of chaff via attention to irreducible geo-
metric objects, the EPS construction is a charming exercise in differential geometry, relating
the 36 components of the symmetric covariant derivative of a (unimodular) conformal metric
density to the 36 components of a (traceless) symmetric projective connection (Weyl, 1921;
Schouten, 1954; Ehlers et al., 1972; Coleman and Korte´, 2001). (Note that a projective
connection is not a connection, but a weaker structure that makes sense in its own right.)
If one makes the volume connection integrable, then one gets a metric up to a constant
numerical factor. This presentation highlights the utility of irreducible geometric objects
(conformal metric density, volume element, projective connection, volume connection)
and the utility of classical differential geometry for isolating them. Unfortunately the
anti-conventionalist argument hinges entirely on the assumption that there is exactly one
11I thank Marco Giovanelli for pointing me to the newly available draft translation (Reichenbach, nd) of
this long lost appendix.
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physically relevant conformal metric density and exactly one physically relevant projective
connection. If one has more than one conformal metric density, or more than one projective
connection, then one can run the Ehlers-Pirani-Schild construction multiple times! Early
critics of anti-conventionalist arguments from the EPS construction realized that it requires
a conventional choice, such as a choice of inertially moving bodies (Gru¨nbaum, 1973b,
ch. 22) (Winnie, 1977, p. 197) (Sklar, 1977, p. 259) (Salmon, 1977a, p. 295). A choice
of inertially moving bodies is in effect a choice of projective connection. Perhaps the
conventionalists did not emphasize enough (though the themes can be found) that (1) the
most interesting question is the modally broad one that considers a variety of theories
rather than a single theory (even ‘our best’), and (2) there exists a moderately interesting
physical theory (or many of them) containing within itself ‘rival’ geometries, that is, more
than one example of a given type of geometric object. Thus EPS manifestly fails to
undermine conventionality for any theory with multiple geometries—the sort that made
conventionalism especially attractive anyway.
As Ben-Menahem pointed out in modern times (Ben-Menahem, 2001), Poincare´ already
envisaged the possibility of theories in which some kinds of matter exhibit one geometry, but
other kinds of matter see another geometry. He writes:
Suppose, for example, that we have a great sphere of radius R and that the
temperature decreases from the center to the surface of this sphere according to
the law of which I have spoken in describing the non-Euclidean world.
We might have bodies whose expansion would be negligible and which would
act like ordinary rigid solids; and, on the other hand, bodies very dilatable and
which would act like non-Euclidean solids. We might have two double pyramids
OABCDEFGH and O′A′B′C ′D′E ′F ′G′H ′ and two triangles αβγ and α′β ′γ′.
The first double pyramid might be rectilinear and the second curvilinear; the
triangle αβγ might be made of inexpansible matter and the other of a very
dilatable matter.
It would then be possible to make the first observations with the double pyramid
OAH and the triangle αβγ, and the second with the double pyramid O′A′H ′
and the triangle α′β ′γ′. And then experiment would seem to prove first that the
Euclidean geometry is true and then that it is false.
Experiments therefore have a bearing, not on space, but on bodies.
(Poincare´, 1913, pp. 88, 89) (emphasis in the original)
One might update the last sentence to say that experiments have a bearing not on the
geometry of space-time, but on the way that geometry(s) appear in the Lagrangian densities
for the various matter fields.
Ben-Menahem, who might be the first to make much of this passage at least for a long
time, comments:
Poincare´ goes to great lengths to show that it is conceivable that different types
of objects conform to different geometries. We could ask a mechanic, he says, to
construct an object that moves in conformity with non-Euclidean geometry, while
other objects retain their Euclidean movement. In the same way, in his hypothet-
ical world, bodies with negligible contraction, that behave like ordinary invari-
able solids, could coexist with more variable bodies that behave in non-Euclidean
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ways. [Quotation of Poincare´ suppressed to avoid repetition.] Is it absurd, ac-
cording to Poincare´, to relinquish the quest for a unified geometry? Probably, on
pragmatic grounds; but it is not incoherent. The conceivability of such pluralism
is another point in favor of conventionalism. (Ben-Menahem, 2001, p. 489)
Apart from massive gravities, the multiple-metric option resurfaced in physics around 1960
with scalar-tensor theories due to Brans and Dicke, with some 1950s ideas by Jordan and
Thiry involving a higher space-time dimensionality. Philosophers eventually noticed this and
other examples and drew conventionalist and/or constructivist conclusions (Weinstein, 1996;
Brown, 2005), in effect reinventing Poincare´’s argument in light of now-extant examples. A
fresh physics paper asks a good question in its title article: “The Nature of Spacetime in
Bigravity: Two Metrics or None?” (Akrami et al., 2015) Such questions could and perhaps
should have appeared in a specific physical theory the 1910s or 1920s with the proposal of
massive scalar gravity. How does the later hardened geometric empiricism or the new realism
address such possibilities?
Massive scalar gravity, had it been available to Reichenbach, would have diverted attention
at least partly away from universal forces, toward almost-universal forces. In massive scalar
gravities, matter seems a conformally flat metric, the volume element being a combination
of a non-dynamical part
√−η and the gravitational potential γ, a literal instantiation of the
Poincare´ epistemological sum of geometry and physics. But the dynamics of gravity itself
exhibits the full flat background geometry. Thus one cannot set gravity, the almost universal
force, to 0. (Recall that such annihilation of universal forces was hailed by Carnap as a great
insight of Reichenbach’s (Reichenbach, 1958, p. vii).) And yet one can never be sure, on
account of the smoothness of the massless limit, that the graviton mass is zero; one has
permanent underdetermination from approximate but arbitrarily close empirical equivalence
(Pitts, 2011b). Thus one can never be sure that the observable geometry is the same as the
geometry pertaining to the symmetries of the theory’s laws. Such a result would hold, at
least prima facie, also for massive variants of General Relativity, the conception of which is
greatly facilitated by the spin 0-spin 2 analogy, replacing a scalar by a symmetric tensor.
But the deep point of conventionalism about geometry is not that the true geometry is
flat, or even that one can retain flat geometry. Though that point is less implausible than
many have thought since the rise of General Relativity (Freund et al., 1969), it doesn’t even
apply for Brans-Dicke scalar-tensor gravity (Weinstein, 1996; Faraoni and Nadeau, 2007).
The deep point is rather that questions about the ‘true geometry’ have no good answers in
general, do not need good answers, and are not very interesting. It is precisely the dearth
of interesting theories that can be built out of just a single metric that makes geometry
so informative in the case of General Relativity (massless spin 2) and Nordstro¨m’s theory
(massless spin 0). Hence the need to expand the modal scope by investigating a larger class of
well motivated theories arises, especially theories without a unique (single-metric) geometry.
7 Gru¨nbaum on Riemann’s Concordance Assumption,
Putnam
The proposal that conventionalists/constructivists and empiricists/realists have been talking
past each other due to different assumed modal scope helps to shed a little light on some
notoriously opaque debates regarding conventionalism in the 1960s-70s. Earman, broadly
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sympathetic to Putnam’s critique of Gru¨nbaum on conventionality but differing on some
details, provides a useful example of focusing attention on the ‘best theory’; Gru¨nbaum may
not always have presented conventionalism in (what I take to be) its strongest light. Earman
wrote:
. . .my goal is the limited one of showing that (i) contrary to Gruenbaum, the gen-
eral theory of relativity (hereafter, GTR) does not support the claim that there
is a latitude for a conventional choice in the standards of spatial and temporal
congruence and that (ii) Gruenbaum’s thesis of the metrical amorphousness of
space and time does not illuminate and does not draw support from the GTR.
(Earman, 1970)
If single-geometry theories are a special case, one where empiricism and realism flourish
and conventionalism and constructivism seem unhelpful, then Earman’s points fit perfectly.
One could define parallel transport and hence congruence in a way incompatible with gµν ,
but doing so would be contraindicated by the convenience, empirical guidance, and judgment
forming parts of Poincare´’s conventionalism at least. Earman’s immediate deprecation of the
result also fits: “. . . I do not view the achievement of this goal as being terribly important
in itself. . . ” (Earman, 1970). The crucial next question is what, if anything, one says about
the broader modal scope, theories that, unlike General Relativity, have multiple geometries.
These theories, though individually unimpressive in most cases, are far more numerous than
single-geometry theories and could be true. They have been taken with much greater seri-
ousness in the past five years (massive spin-2 gravity, bigravity) than at most times in the
past.
Something like Poincare´’s modal argument for conventionality is suggested by Gru¨nbaum’s
invocation of Max von Laue’s discussion of bimetric theories (Gru¨nbaum, 1977, note 74)
(von Laue, 1953, pp. 186-196), which mentions work by Levi-Civita, Nathan Rosen, Achille
Papapetrou, and Max Kohler. Because a space-time metric induces a connection, two metrics
induce (at least) two connections. Actually one can define more than two connections, most
obviously by splitting metrics into conformal and volume pieces, splitting connections into
projective (traceless) and pure trace (volume) pieces, and mixing and matching. There seems
to be no objection to taking arbitrarily weighted geometric means of the volume elements√−gu√−η(1−u) (giving arbitrarily weighted arithmetic means of the volume connections
by logarithmic differentiation) and arbitrarily weighted arithmetic means of the projective
connections vΓˆαµν + (1 − v) ˆ{αµν}, achieving a 2-parameter family of connections using just
two metrics. Hence bimetric geometry from the 1920s raises most or all the issues raised
by metric-incompatible connections from the late 1910s.12 Clearly the connection associated
with one metric will generically be incompatible with a different metric (excepting the trivial
case where one metric is a constant times the other). Of course there is no direct route from
having some geometrical entity in a theory to that entity’s having direct chronogeometric
significance (Freund et al., 1969; Brown, 2005; Butterfield, 2007; Knox, 2013). One has to
look at the matter Lagrangian density to ascertain what geometry(s) matter actually sees.
It also isn’t terribly easy to get every type of matter to couple to a connection except via a
metric. (The “hypermomentum” of Friedrich Hehl and collaborators would fill in this gap
(Hehl et al., 1976).) Hence in considering stories about the physical meaning of a connection
12A classic treatment of the non-metricity tensor is Schouten’s (Schouten, 1954).
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incompatible with the/a metric,13 one wants to think in some detail about their physical
realizability.
The idea(s) that parallel transport might fail to be compatible with (the? a?) metric
is an interesting issue highlighted by Gru¨nbaum, quite separable from the question of the
clarity of his distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic metrics. I take the liberty of making
a lengthy quotation, which is punctuated by useful quotations from Einstein, Marzke and
Wheeler, and Reichenbach.
1. Let us note first that an important empirical hypothesis actually underlies
the alleged conceptual necessity to metrize any kind of P -space by means of rods
and tapes. The pertinent hypothesis was characterized as empirical by Einstein
as follows:
All practical geometry is based upon a principle which is accessible to
experience, and which we will now try to realise. We will call that
which is enclosed between two boundaries, marked upon a practically-
rigid body, a tract. We imagine two practically-rigid bodies, each with
a tract marked out on it. These two tracts are said to be “equal to one
another” if the boundaries of the one tract can be brought to coincide
permanently with the boundaries of the other. We now assume that:
If two tracts are found to be equal once and anywhere, they are equal
always and everywhere.
Not only the practical geometry of Euclid, but also its nearest general-
isation, the practical geometry of Riemann and therewith the general
theory of relativity, rest upon this assumption ([reference to a reprint
of (Einstein, 1922)]).
As I have done previously elsewhere ([(Gru¨nbaum, 1968)], pp. 272, 277), I shall
refer to the empirical assumption just formulated by Einstein as “Riemann’s
concordance assumption,” or, briefly, as “RCA.”. . .
We see that the empirical truth of RCA plays the following role: It is a necessary
condition for the consistent use of rigid rods in assigning lengths to space intervals
that any collection of two or more initially coinciding unit solid rods of whatever
chemical constitution can thereafter be used interchangeably everywhere in the
P -manifold independently of their paths of transport, unless they are subjected
to independently designatable perturbing influences. Thus, the assumption is
made here that there is a concordance in the coincidence behavior of solid rods
such that no inconsistency would result from the subsequent interchangeable use
of initially coinciding unit rods, if they remain unperturbed or “rigid” in the
specified sense. In short, there is concordance among rigid rods such that all
13There is of course a large difference between a connection’s being incompatible with some metric, which is
a relation between that connection and that metric, and a connection’s not being compatible with any metric.
Being compatible with some specific metric yields a familiar but optional antisymmetry of the Riemann tensor
with one index lowered by that metric (Wald, 1984, p. 39) (Misner et al., 1973, pp. 324, 325). For more
detail see ((Edgar, 1991; Edgar, 1992; Edgar, 1994)). An even stronger sort of metric-incompatibility comes
from not being compatible even with any volume element; such a property (not a relation) implies that the
trace of the connection coefficients has non-zero curl, which is just the non-vanishing of the other trace of
the primordial (1, 3) Riemann tensor.
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rigid unit rods alike yield the same metric and the same geometry. It will be
recalled that in section 2(c), (i), we had occasion to cite the following comment
on RCA by Marzke and Wheeler:
This postulate is not obvious and, in principle, could even be wrong.
For example, Weyl once proposed (and later had to give up) a unified
theory of electromagnetism and gravitation in which the Riemann pos-
tulate was abandoned. In Weyl’s theory, two measuring rods, cut to
have identical lengths at a point A in space-time, and carried by dif-
ferent routes to a point C, will differ in length when they are brought
together ([(Marzke and Wheeler, 1964)], p. 58).
There we also noted that Marzke and Wheeler consider “what kind
of physics would not be compatible with Riemann’s postulate,” of-
fer the “Validity of Pauli Principle as Partial Evidence for Rie-
mann’s Postulate” ([(Marzke and Wheeler, 1964)], p. 60), but conclude
([(Marzke and Wheeler, 1964)], p. 61) that “It would be desirable to have a
more decisive experimental argument for the Riemannian postulate.”
In the philosophical literature, Reichenbach has given a vivid description of the
kinds of phenomena that would occur if solid bodies were to violate RCA, as they
do in Weyl’s kind of nonRiemannian geometry. This description, which appears
in the German original of his classic Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre but not in
the 1958 English translation [58], runs as follows:
. . . whether we could put, say, six chairs in a row into a room would
depend on the path by which the chairs were to be brought into the
room, and we might perhaps first have to let our chairs make a trip
around the world so that the room could accommodate them. By the
same token, it would be uncertain whether a visitor could fit onto one
of the chairs; this would depend on his prior trajectory. Such states
of affairs might perhaps strike us as strange, but they are logically
possible; and were they to obtain, humans would surely have come to
terms with them ([57], p. 333; translation is mine [Gru¨nbaum’s]).
It is, of course, irrelevant to the issue posed by Swinburne that Weyl’s non-
Riemannian geometry, in which rods are held to violate RCA, did not succeed
empirically as a unified theory of electromagnetism and gravitation. Instead, the
import of the logical possibility that the hypothesis RCA might be empirically
false emerges from the following considerations.. . . (Gru¨nbaum, 1970, pp. 571,
572)
Where Gru¨nbaum finds a significant philosophical issue (more or less correctly, though
my caution about achieving chronogeometric significance for a geometrical structure in the
physical laws via a Lagrangian density, rather than by ‘by hand’, should be recalled), and it
involves a broad modal scope, Putnam only finds paradox:
Reichenbach used to begin his lectures on the Philosophy of Space and Time in
a way which already brought an air of paradox to the subject. He would take
two objects of markedly different size, say an ash tray and a table, situated in
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different parts of the room, and ask the students “How do you know that one is
bigger than the other?” (Putnam, 1975b)
Apparently such possibilities were not among those that Putnam was prepared to conceive;
the problem is Putnam’s. Insofar as one can think of a rigid rod as a vector to undergo
parallel transport, the possibility of parallel transport according to a connection not derived
from or even compatible with14 the metric that one is considering can be readily entertained;
it is part of the great conceptual advance of recognizing the connection as an entity inde-
pendent of a metric (Schouten, 1954). One might think that parallel transport with respect
to a metric-incompatible connection is always merely due to an unwise choice of connec-
tion. But there are theories in which non-metricity plays a dynamical role (Hehl, 1976;
Hehl et al., 1981), which one ought not to refuse to entertain. Furthermore, there are con-
nections that are not compatible with any metric. Hence simply making a wiser choice of
connection to avoid non-metricity might not be an option. Reichenbach and Gru¨nbaum
both explored the idea of connections not derived from a metric (Reichenbach, 1928, un-
translated German appendix) (Reichenbach, nd; Reichenbach, 1929b; Reichenbach, 1929a;
Gru¨nbaum, 1973a). By contrast, Putnam’s work on space-time physics (Putnam, 1975a;
Putnam, 1967; Putnam, 1975b) seems not to profit from developments in physics and geom-
etry after 1916, such as Weyl’s work on connections that are not based wholly on a metric,
not to mention Levi-Civita’s bimetric geometry or the whole tradition of particle physi-
cists’ work on gravity. Even after Gru¨nbaum’s detailed consideration of the possible failure
of Riemann’s concordance hypothesis (Gru¨nbaum, 1970), Putnam’s discussion defaults to
single-metric General Relativity, evading the issue of what to make of theories with mul-
tiple or ‘rival’ geometric ingredients. According to Putnam’s early critique of Gru¨nbaum’s
philosophy of geometry,
In sum: our alleged ‘freedom’ to choose a different gik tensor (a different space-
time metric) at the cost of complicating the laws of nature is in fact never em-
ployed in the general theory of relativity. All observers are required to ‘choose’
the same space-time metric. (Putnam, 1975a)
Putnam has defaulted to the narrow scope of ‘our best theory’ and so has surrepti-
tiously achieved a sort of home-field advantage. But still he falters: one can per-
haps rescue this descriptive claim from effortless falsification even using literature before
1963 (including Gupta’s foundational work on quantum gravity (Rosen, 1940; Rosen, 1974;
Papapetrou, 1948; Kohler, 1952; Kohler, 1953; von Laue, 1953; Gupta, 1952; Gupta, 1954;
Gupta, 1957)) if one carefully gerrymanders the physics literature so that the many coun-
terexamples, some of them by eminent authors, do not count as “the general theory of
relativity.” Putnam wrote those words at roughly the time of Feynman’s significant further
development of particle physics treatments of General Relativity (Feynman, 1963), which
circulated informally (Feynman, 1971) and then eventually mostly were published as a book
(Feynman et al., 1995). But then one will need to credit other authors with inventing an
alternative theory that shares the same field equations, or uses the same field equations as a
classical starting point before quantizing, or the like. Space-time physics is a bit like heaven
and earth as portrayed by Hamlet to Horatio:
14Torsion offers the possibility of a connection compatible with a metric but not derived from it
(Knox, 2013).
31
“[t]here are more things in heaven and earth. . .
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”
Subsequent work will discuss how massive scalar gravity, if entertained at the right time
in the right context, would have blocked Moritz Schlick’s sociologically successful overthrow
of Kantian synthetic a priori knowledge, and how Einstein’s widely followed false analogy
between his reinvented Seeliger-Neumann modification of gravity and his cosmological con-
stant (Schucking, 1991) facilitated the neglect of massive (spin 0 and spin 2) gravity during
1917-1939, much of the era when the fate of Kantian philosophy was settled negatively and
logical empiricism took shape.
8 Appendix: Malament-Weatherall-Manchak Confor-
mal Restriction of Conventionality Evaded
It has been argued that the conventionality of space-time metric geometry, whatever one
makes of it, should be restricted to conformally related metrics, the null cone structure
being factual rather than conventional (Malament, 1985; Weatherall and Manchak, 2014).
That claim appears to be a technical point motivated by a conceptual point that causality
is not conventional for Reichenbach. Indeed causality is not conventional for Reichenbach,
but the geometrical use of that null cone field that marks out causality, rather than an
arbitrarily chosen one, is conventional—at least, no less conventional than the metric is.
The geometry of angles, being a part of the geometry of distances, automatically inherits
whatever conventionality there might be in metric geometry that survives the excision of
volumes. Thomas’s decomposition shows how to apply Reichenbach’s conventionality-of-
geometry equation
g′µν + Fµν = gµν
(Reichenbach, 1958) to the conformal part of a metric, pace the claim that the two metrics
must be conformally related.
Using the Thomas-style decomposition for both g′µν and gµν , and letting bars || signify a
matrix determinant, one can show that
gˆ′µν + Fµν(−g′)−
1
4
(−|gˆ′αβ + Fαβ(−g′)−
1
4 |) 14 = gˆµν . (8)
(The exponents ±1
4
reflect the 4-dimensionality of space-time, but the expression generalizes.)
Thus the universal ‘force’ (potential) making the conformal geometry no less conventional
than the metric geometry is Fαβ(−g′)− 14—or, better yet, a certain 90% of it. At least if
Fµν is small enough for perturbative expansion, then the universal force for the conformal
geometry is the gˆ′µν-traceless part of Fαβ(−g′)−
1
4 . One easily sees that if Fµν is proportional
to gˆ′µν , then it cancels out of the conformal part. Other parametrizations of a metric and,
concomitantly, its conformal part are of course possible (Isham et al., 1972). It would be an
interesting but nontrivial task to say something global about these issues.
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